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STATEMENT REGARDING CONSENT TO FILE 
 Appellants and Appellees have consented to the filing of the State 
Legislators’ brief amici curiae. 
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INTEREST OF THE AMICI CURIAE 
Amici Curiae, a group of 154 State Legislators from 26 States, be-
lieve that the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (“the Act”) is 
constitutional and are working hard in their States to implement the 
Act in a timely, efficient, and effective manner.  They have a substantial 
interest in having this matter resolved expeditiously and in favor of the 
constitutionality of the Act.   
Among the Amici State Legislators are legislators from 15 of the 
States represented by the Plaintiffs.  These legislators have a particular 
interest in this case in order to represent their constituents and many 
other residents and State leaders in the Plaintiffs’ respective States 
who disagree with Plaintiffs’ legal arguments and support health care 
reform.  All of the Amici State Legislators have an interest in present-
ing their view of the federalism issues in this case, given that the Plain-
tiffs have purported to represent the interests of the States generally in 
this lawsuit. 
As State leaders themselves, Amici State Legislators have a 
strong interest in the manner in which the interests of their States and 
the rights of the States in general are represented in this lawsuit.  Ami-
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ci State Legislators believe that the Act respects constitutional prin-
ciples of federalism and benefits the States and their citizens. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
 Whether the district court erred in holding that the minimum cov-
erage provision of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act is not 
a valid exercise of Congress’ powers under the Commerce Clause and 
the Necessary and Proper Clause? 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
 In granting summary judgment below, Judge Vinson prefaced his 
decision with the following description of this litigation: 
[T]his case is not about whether the Act is wise or unwise 
legislation, or whether it will solve or exacerbate the myriad 
problems in our health care system.  In fact, it is not really 
about our health care system at all.  It is principally about 
our federalist system, and it raises very important issues re-
garding the Constitutional role of the federal government. 
Florida v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., No. 3:10-cv-00091-RV, 
Jan. 31, 2011, at 1-2 (emphasis added).  The court below correctly iden-
tified  the crucial constitutional issue in the case, but declared the Act 
unconstitutional based on a fundamentally flawed vision of the consti-
tutional role of our federal government and its partnership with the 
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States—a vision that contradicts the original meaning of our Founding 
charter.   
 The idea that the federal government does not have the power to 
address a national problem such as the health care crisis has no basis  
in the Constitution’s text and history.  The Father of our Nation, George 
Washington, and the other delegates to the Constitutional Convention 
shared a conviction that the Constitution must establish a national gov-
ernment of sufficient, substantial power.  In considering how to grant 
such power to the national government, the delegates adopted Resolu-
tion VI, which declared that Congress should have authority “to legis-
late in all Cases for the general Interests of the Union, and also in those 
to which the States are separately incompetent, or in which the Harmo-
ny of the United States may be interrupted by the Exercise of individual 
legislation.”  2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 at 
131-32 (Max Farrand, ed., rev. ed. 1966). 
 Tasked with translating the principle of Resolution VI into specific 
provisions, the Committee of Detail drafted Article I to grant Congress 
the broad power to, among other things, “regulate Commerce with for-
eign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tri-
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bes.”  U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 3.  While the concept of “commerce” in 
this Clause has always encompassed economic activity or trade, the 
original meaning of “commerce” in the Constitution carried “a broader 
meaning referring to all forms of intercourse in the affairs of life, 
whether or not narrowly economic or mediated by explicit markets.”  
AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 107 (2005).  
As Chief Justice John Marshall explained, “Commerce, undoubtedly, is 
traffic, but it is something more: it is intercourse.”  Gibbons v. Ogden, 
22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 189 (1824).  Thus, the lower court’s vision of a 
Commerce Clause power strictly curtailed by a requirement of self-
initiated economic activity cannot be squared with the Clause’s original 
meaning.   
 The lower court’s interpretation of the Necessary and Proper 
Clause is similarly unsupported by constitutional text and history.  Far 
from the cramped vision of the Clause used by the court below, the 
grant of power to “make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper 
for carrying into execution” constitutionally granted powers was in-
tended to be sweeping.  U.S. CONST. art. I, §8, cl. 18.  As Alexander 
Hamilton explained to President Washington, “[t]he means by which 
Case: 11-11021     Date Filed: 04/08/2011     Page: 26 of 60
 5 
 
national exigencies are to be provided for, national inconveniences ob-
viated, national prosperity promoted, are of such infinite variety, extent 
and complexity, that there must of necessity be great latitude of discre-
tion in the selection and application of those means.”  THE PAPERS OF 
GEORGE WASHINGTON DIGITAL EDITION (Theodore J. Crackel, ed. 2008) 
(Letter from Alexander Hamilton to George Washington, Opinion on the 
Constitutionality of an Act to Establish a Bank, 1791).  As recognized 
by our first President, the rest of the Framers, and the Supreme Court 
from the Founding to the present, the Necessary and Proper Clause 
grants Congress the power to use means outside the enumerated list of 
Article I powers to achieve the federal ends contemplated in the Consti-
tution.   
 The Affordable Care Act falls within Congress’s constitutionally-
granted powers, and, just as important, it does not infringe upon any 
other constitutionally guaranteed rights.  There is no constitutionally 
protected right to freeload that is infringed by the individual responsi-
bility aspect of the minimum coverage provision.   
Nor does the Act’s expansion of Medicaid tread upon state sove-
reignty.  Health care reform was imperative for Americans, as well as 
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for their State and local governments.  The ever-rising costs of and li-
mited access to insurance coverage and health care have severely 
stressed the budgets of State governments and American families, and 
literally resulted in tens of thousands of deaths each year.  While the 
Plaintiffs claim that the Act’s Medicaid-related provisions are unconsti-
tutional under the Ninth and Tenth Amendments, this argument is 
fundamentally flawed in light of the fact that States continue to have 
the option to opt out of Medicaid altogether.  The Constitution allows 
the federal government to condition federal funds and programs in a 
certain way, allowing States to choose whether to participate and accept 
those conditions, or not.  It is well-established that “Congress may at-
tach conditions on the receipt of federal funds.”  South Dakota v. Dole, 
483 U.S. 203, 206 (1987).   
The Plaintiffs’ Medicaid claims appear to seek a judicial “do-over” 
on the Act, trying to get this Court to craft a health care reform law 
that is more to the Plaintiffs’ liking.  See, e.g., Pls.’ Mem. Supp. Summ. 
J. 26 (praising the Medicaid program of the 1960s and 1970s as “the 
hallmark of cooperative federalism” but objecting to the “new” Medicaid 
Case: 11-11021     Date Filed: 04/08/2011     Page: 28 of 60
 7 
 
standards).  That is an effort that belongs in the political arena, not the 
courts. 
 Under a faithful reading of the Constitution, the Affordable Care 
Act is a valid exercise of Congress’s power to address issues of national 
concern, and respects principles of federalism.   
ARGUMENT 
I. The Framers Wrote The Constitution To Give The Federal 
Government Legislative Power To Address National Con-
cerns, While Preserving The States’ Ability To Act In Mat-
ters That Do Not Require A National Response. 
 
Our Constitution was drafted in 1787 “in Order to form a more 
perfect Union”—both more perfect than the British tyranny against 
which the founding generation had revolted and more perfect than the 
flawed Articles of Confederation under which Americans had lived for a 
decade since declaring independence.  The result was a vibrant system 
of federalism that gives broad power to the federal government to act in 
circumstances in which a national approach is necessary or preferable, 
while reserving a significant role for the States to craft innovative poli-
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cy solutions reflecting the diversity of America’s people, places, and 
ideas.   
By the time our Founders took up the task of drafting the Consti-
tution in 1787, they had lived for nearly a decade under the dysfunc-
tional Articles of Confederation.  The Articles of Confederation, adopted 
in 1777 and ratified in 1781, established a confederacy built merely on a 
“firm league of friendship” between thirteen independent states.  AR-
TICLES OF CONFEDERATION (1781), art. III.  There was only a single 
branch of national government, the Congress, which was made up of 
state delegations.  Id. art. V.  Under the Articles, Congress had some 
powers, but was given no means to execute those powers.  Congress 
could not directly tax individuals or legislate upon them; it had no ex-
press power to make laws that would be binding in the states’ courts 
and no general power to establish national courts, and it could raise 
money only by making requests to the states.   
This created such an ineffectual central government that, accord-
ing to George Washington, it nearly cost Americans victory in the Revo-
lutionary War.  In the midst of several American wartime setbacks, 
Washington lamented that, “unless Congress speaks with a more deci-
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sive tone; unless they are vested with powers by the several States 
competent to the great purposes of War . . . our Cause is lost.”  18 THE 
WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 453 (John C. Fitzpatrick, ed. 1931) 
(Letter to Joseph Jones, May 31, 1780).   
Washington favored strong federal power not just in military mat-
ters, but also in other areas of national concern.  Shortly after the Revo-
lutionary War was won, Washington wrote to Alexander Hamilton stat-
ing plainly that “[n]o man in the United States is, or can be more deeply 
impressed with the necessity of a reform in our present Confederation 
than myself.”  Id. at 505 (Letter to Alexander Hamilton, March 31, 
1783).  Washington explained that, “unless Congress have powers com-
petent to all general purposes, that the distresses we have encountered, 
the expences we have incurred, and the blood we have spilt in the 
course of an Eight years war, will avail us nothing.”  Id. at 490 (Letter 
to Alexander Hamilton, March 4, 1783) (emphasis in original).  See also 
id. at 519 (Circular to State Governments, June 8, 1783) (“[I]t is indis-
pensible to the happiness of the individual States, that there should be 
lodged somewhere, a Supreme Power to regulate and govern the general 
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concerns of the Confederated Republic, without which the Union cannot 
be of long duration.”). 
After securing independence, the Founders turned their focus on 
creating a new, better form of government with a sufficiently strong 
federal power.1  In considering how to grant such power to the national 
government, the delegates to the Constitutional Convention adopted 
Resolution VI, which declared that Congress should have authority “to 
legislate in all Cases for the general Interests of the Union, and also in 
those Cases to which the States are separately incompetent, or in which 
the Harmony of the United States may be interrupted by the Exercise of 
individual legislation.”  2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 
1787 at 131-32 (Max Farrand, ed., rev. ed. 1966).    The delegates then 
                                                            
1 Indeed, it is indicative of the shift from revolution to statecraft that 
the Constitution’s first Article gives Congress the power to impose a 
broad range of “Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises.”  U.S. CONST. art. I, 
§ 8, cl. 1.  “Thus, only a decade after they revolted against imperial tax-
es, Americans were being asked to authorize a sweeping regime of con-
tinental taxes, with the decisive difference that these new taxes would 
be decided on by public servants chosen by the American people them-
selves—taxation with representation.”  AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S 
CONSTITUTION, at 107.  Suggestions that the legitimate complaints of 
the “Boston Tea Party” in 1775 animated the Founders during the Con-
stitutional Convention in 1787 are thus deeply flawed.  E.g., Florida v. 
U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., No. 3:10-cv-00091-RV, Jan. 31, 
2011, at 42. 
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passed Resolution VI on to the Committee of Detail, which was respon-
sible for drafting the enumerated powers of Congress in Article I, to 
transform this general principle into an enumerated list of powers in 
the Constitution.   
As constitutional scholar Jack Balkin explains, Resolution VI es-
tablished a structural constitutional principle with “its focus on state 
competencies and the general interests of the Union.”  Jack M. Balkin, 
Commerce, 109 MICH. L. REV. 1, 10 (2010).   Translating this principle 
into specific provisions, the Committee of Detail drafted Article I to 
grant Congress the broad power to, among other things, regulate inter-
state commerce and tax and spend to “provide for the . . . general Wel-
fare of the United States.”  U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 1.  These enume-
rated powers were intended to capture the idea that “whatever object of 
government extends, in its operation or effects, beyond the bounds of a 
particular state, should be considered as belonging to the government of 
the United States.”  2 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS 
ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION AS RECOMMENDED BY 
THE GENERAL CONVENTION AT PHILADELPHIA 424 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d 
ed. 1836) (hereinafter ELLIOT’S DEBATES) (Statement of James Wilson). 
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The enumeration of powers was not intended to displace the gen-
eral principle of Resolution VI that Congress should have the general 
ability to legislate in matters of national concern.  As James Wilson, a 
member of the Committee of Detail who was also “America’s leading 
lawyer and one of only six men to have signed both the Declaration of 
Independence and the Constitution,”2 explained: 
[T]hough this principle be sound and satisfactory, its appli-
cation to particular cases would be accompanied with much 
difficulty, because, in its application, room must be allowed 
for great discretionary latitude of construction of the prin-
ciple.  In order to lessen or remove the difficulty arising from 
discretionary construction on this subject, an enumeration of 
particular instances, in which the application of the principle 
ought to take place, has been attempted with much industry 
and care.  
 
2 ELLIOT’S DEBATES 424-25 (emphasis added).  The drafters of the Con-
stitution thus made clear that in each enumerated instance in Article 
I—whether regulating “commerce” or levying taxes—the understanding 
was that Congress would exercise the enumerated power while applying 
the general principle that Congress has power to regulate in cases of 
national concern.3  This list of enumerated powers was not an attempt 
                                                            
2 AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION, 7. 
3  Some scholars have suggested that the Committee of Detail rejected 
Resolution VI or that the Convention repudiated it because the precise 
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to limit the federal government for its own sake, but rather “[t]he list of 
enumerated powers was designed so that the new federal government 
would have power to pass laws on subjects and concerning problems 
that are federal by nature.”  Balkin, Commerce, 12. 
A. The Framers Included The Commerce Clause In 
The Constitution To Allow The Federal Govern-
ment To Legislate Affairs Among The Several States 
That Require A Federal Response. 
 
Congress’s power to “regulate Commerce … among the several 
States,” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3., “is closely linked to the general 
structural purpose of Congress’s enumerated powers as articulated by 
the Framers: to give Congress power to legislate in all cases where 
states are separately incompetent or where the interest of the nation 
might be undermined by unilateral or conflicting state action.”  Balkin, 
Commerce, at 6.   
                                                                                                                                                                                               
language of the Resolution was not written into the Constitution.  E.g., 
RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMP-
TION OF LIBERTY (2004).  But after the delegates passed Resolution VI, 
the Committee of Detail had no power to reject it, and, as Wilson’s 
comments make clear, the Committee embraced the Resolution’s prin-
ciple and attempted to implement it in Article I.  See Balkin, Commerce, 
10-11.     
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 While commerce has always encompassed economic activity or 
trade, the original meaning of “commerce” in the Constitution carried “a 
broader meaning referring to all forms of intercourse in the affairs of 
life, whether or not narrowly economic or mediated by explicit markets.”  
AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION, 107.  As explained by Chief Justice 
John Marshall in Gibbons v. Ogden, “[c]ommerce, undoubtedly, is traf-
fic, but it is something more: it is intercourse.”  22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 
194 (1824).  See Balkin, Commerce, at 21 (“When people like George 
Washington, John Marshall, and Joseph Story use the words ‘commerce’ 
and ‘intercourse’ interchangeably, perhaps we should listen to them.”).  
 Only if “commerce” is read in light of this broader definition does 
the Commerce Clause effectuate the Framers’ direction that Congress 
should have authority to legislate in all matters that raise a federal 
concern.  See 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 
131-32.  Reading interstate and international “commerce” broadly in the 
Commerce Clause fits with “the framers’ general goals by enabling 
Congress to regulate . . . interactions that, if improperly handled by a 
single state acting on its own, might lead to needless wars or otherwise 
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compromise the interests of sister states.”  AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITU-
TION, at 107.      
While the meaning of commerce in the Constitution was intended 
to be broad, the text of the Commerce Clause places significant limits 
on federal regulation to preserve state autonomy: Congress can only act 
if a given problem genuinely spills across state or national lines.  As 
Chief Justice Marshall explained in Gibbons, the Commerce Clause 
uses the word “among” to mean “intermingled with” and that “com-
merce among the States” means “commerce which concerns more States 
than one.”  22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 194.  If commerce within a single state 
has external effects on other states or on the Nation as a whole then it 
falls under Congress’s constitutional regulatory authority; if commerce 
is “completely internal” to a state, then Congress has no power to regu-
late.  Id.  The “among” requirement of the Commerce Clause thus al-
lows Congress to regulate interactions or affairs among the several 
states, including matters “that are mingled among the states or affect 
more than one state, because they cross state borders, because they 
produce collective action problems among the states, or because they 
involve activity in one state that has spillover effects in other states.”  
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Balkin, Commerce, at 23.  See also United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 
(1995).  In other words, the Commerce Clause contains an important 
limiting principle—but it is derived more from the word “among” than 
from an improperly narrow reading of “commerce.” 
Reading the Commerce Clause with the broad understanding of 
“commerce” as “intercourse,” and the limitation that such “intercourse” 
must be truly federal in nature in that it affects national interests or 
involves a matter that states cannot effectively address on their own, 
connects the text of the Clause to the principle in Resolution VI that 
animated the drafting of Congress’s enumerated powers in Article I.  As 
Chief Justice Marshall explained in interpreting the Commerce Clause: 
The genius and character of the whole government seem 
to be, that its action is to be applied to all the external 
concerns of the nation, and to those internal concerns 
which affect the States generally; but not to those which 
are completely within a particular State, which do not af-
fect other States, and with which it is not necessary to in-
terfere, for the purpose of executing some of the general 
powers of the government. 
Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 195. 
Looking at Congress’s Commerce Clause power based on the text 
and history of the Constitution, Congress’s power to enact the minimum 
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coverage provision is clear.  Even if, like the lower court, this Court con-
ceived of the decision to remain uninsured as a non-economic matter, 
this would be irrelevant: under the original meaning of the Commerce 
Clause, the real question is whether such a decision raises federal con-
cerns by, for example, causing spillover effects, which may themselves 
be economic in nature, creating a problem for more than a single state.  
See Balkin, Commerce, at 44; U.S. Br. at 46-49.  In addition, the mini-
mum coverage provision addresses collective action problems in the 
States: there is the distinct possibility that “[p]eople with health prob-
lems will have incentives to move to a state where they cannot be 
turned down, raising health care costs for everyone, while insurers will 
prefer to do business in states where they can avoid more expensive pa-
tients with pre-existing conditions, and younger and healthier people 
may leave for jurisdictions where they can avoid paying for health in-
surance.”  Balkin, Commerce, at 46.  The provision falls squarely within 
Congress’s ability to regulate “commerce” “for the general interests of 
the Union,” and also in those instances in “which the States are sepa-
rately incompetent.”  2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 
1787 at 131-32.   
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B. Under The Text And Original Meaning Of The  
Necessary And Proper Clause, Congress Has Broad 
Latitude To Employ Legislative Means Naturally 
Related To The Lawful Objects Or Ends Of The 
Federal Government. 
As discussed above, the drafters of the Constitution were mindful 
of Resolution VI’s general principle—that Congress should have the 
ability to respond to matters of national concern—in wording federal 
enumerated powers broadly.  In the Federalist Papers, Alexander Ham-
ilton exhorted the nation that  
we must bear in mind that we are not to confine our view 
to the present period, but to look forward to remote futur-
ity.... Nothing, therefore, can be more fallacious than to 
infer the extent of any power, proper to be lodged in the 
national government from an estimate of its immediate 
necessities.  There ought to be a capacity to provide for 
future exigencies as they may happen….   
THE FEDERALIST PAPERS No. 34, at 203 (emphasis in original).   
Perhaps nowhere in the Constitution is the goal to provide Con-
gress with discretion to address federal matters more manifest than in 
the Necessary and Proper Clause, which gives Congress the power “[t]o 
make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into 
Execution the foregoing Powers ….”  U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.  As 
Hamilton explained to President Washington, “[t]he whole turn of the 
[Necessary and Proper Clause] indicates that it was the intent of the 
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Convention, by that clause, to give a liberal latitude to the exercise of 
the specified powers.”  THE PAPERS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON DIGITAL 
EDITION (Theodore J. Crackel, ed. 2008) (Letter from Alexander Hamil-
ton to George Washington, Opinion on the Constitutionality of an Act to 
Establish a Bank, 1791).  Hamilton described the broad discretion given 
to Congress under the Necessary and Proper Clause as follows:  “If the 
end be clearly comprehended within any of the specified powers, and if 
the measure have an obvious relation to that end, and is not forbidden 
by any particular provision of the constitution; it may safely be deemed 
to come within the compass of the national authority.”  Id.  President 
Washington agreed with Hamilton’s exegesis of the constitutional pow-
ers of the federal government, approving the bill to establish a national 
bank and hailing Hamilton’s vision of federal power.  8 THE PAPERS OF 
GEORGE WASHINGTON: PRESIDENTIAL SERIES 359 (Letter to David 
Humphreys, July 20, 1791). 
The Supreme Court, from the Founding-era to the present, has al-
so agreed with Hamilton’s view of federal power under the Necessary 
and Proper Clause.  Chief Justice Marshall explained in McCulloch v. 
Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819), that Congress should be 
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shown significant deference regarding what laws it considers to be ap-
propriate in carrying out its constitutional duties.  In language very 
similar to Hamilton’s, the Court in McCulloch explained, “[l]et the end 
be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution, and all 
means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, 
which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the 
constitution, are constitutional.”  17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 421.  As the Su-
preme Court has long held, “the Necessary and Proper Clause makes 
clear that the Constitution’s grants of specific federal legislative author-
ity are accompanied by broad power to enact laws that are ‘convenient, 
or useful’ or ‘conducive’ to the authority’s ‘beneficial exercise.’”  United 
States v. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. 1949, 1956 (2010) (quoting McCulloch, 17 
U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 413, 418, 421). 
Thus, while this Court can and should uphold the minimum cov-
erage provision as a constitutional exercise of Congress’s Commerce 
Clause authority, it could also uphold the provision as a law that is “ne-
cessary and proper for carrying into execution”4 Congress’s power to re-
gulate commerce among the several States.  The Act is designed to 
                                                            
4 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. 
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make health care coverage affordable to all Americans and to prohibit 
certain insurance practices, such as the denial of coverage to individu-
als with pre-existing conditions.  See Br. of U.S. at 13-15.  Among many 
other reasons, if Americans can go uninsured until they get sick and 
then impose these costs on those who already have health insurance 
policies, the ban on pre-existing conditions will be prohibitively expen-
sive and the cost of insurance will increase across the board.  Id. at 28-
32.  Congress determined that the minimum coverage provision was the 
appropriate means of regulating the health care and insurance markets.   
The court below appears to have read the Necessary and Proper 
Clause to allow only those means of execution that are absolutely indis-
pensable to the power being executed.  But this interpretation of the 
Clause was soundly rejected more than two hundred years ago.  McCul-
loch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 406, 408 (explaining that the Constitution’s 
framers did not intend to impede the exercise of enumerated powers “by 
withholding a choice of means,” noting that, unlike the Articles of Con-
federation, the Constitution does not “require[] that everything granted 
shall be expressly and minutely described”).  As Hamilton wrote to 
President Washington, the idea that the Clause allows only means of 
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execution that are so necessary that without them “the grant of the 
power would be nugatory,” is so potentially detrimental to constitution-
al government that “[i]t is essential to the being of the National Gov-
ernment that so erroneous a conception of the word necessary, shou’d be 
exploded.”  Letter from Alexander Hamilton to George Washington, 
Opinion on the Constitutionality of an Act to Establish a Bank, 1791 
(emphasis in original).   “Necessary” in the Clause “means no more than 
needful, requisite, incidental, useful, or conducive to” the enumerated 
grant of power.  Id. (emphasis in original).  See also Comstock, 130 S. 
Ct. at 1956 (holding that the Necessary and Proper Clause affords Con-
gress the power to use any “means that is rationally related to the im-
plementation of a constitutionally enumerated power”).   
* * * 
To be sure, the powers of the federal government under our Con-
stitution are not unlimited.  As the Tenth Amendment affirms, the Con-
stitution establishes a central government of enumerated powers, and 
the States play a vital role in our federalist system.  But the powers our 
charter does grant to the federal government are broad and substan-
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tial.5  And, since the Founding, the American people have amended the 
Constitution to ensure that Congress has all the tools it needs to ad-
dress national problems and protect the constitutional rights of all 
Americans.  E.g., U.S. CONST. amends. XIII, XIV, XV, XVI, XIX.   
II. The Affordable Care Act Respects The Federal-
State Partnership On Health Care And Preserves 
Constitutional Federalism. 
 
In addition to challenging the minimum coverage provision, Plain-
tiffs are cross-appealing the rejection by the District Court of claims 
challenging the Act’s expansion of Medicaid.  These claims are of the 
kitchen sink variety—alleging coercion, commandeering and violations 
of the Spending Clause, the Ninth and Tenth Amendment—and should 
be rejected for the simple reasons that Medicaid is an entirely voluntary 
program and the Act is an example of cooperative federalism at its best.   
As discussed above, the federal system in the United States is 
founded on a Constitution that gives broad power to the federal gov-
ernment to act when a national solution is necessary or preferable, 
                                                            
5 See Letter from Alexander Hamilton to George Washington, Opinion 
on the Constitutionality of an Act to Establish a Bank, 1791 (discussing 
“the variety and extent of public exigencies, a far greater proportion of 
which, and of a far more critical kind, are objects of National than of 
State—administration”). 
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while preserving the role of State and local governments to create policy 
responsive to local needs and customs.  States historically have been 
leaders in policy innovations that better protect their citizens, re-
sources, and environment.  See Exec. Order on Federalism No. 13132, 
64 Fed. Reg. 43255, § 2(e) (Aug. 4, 1999) (“States possess unique author-
ities, qualities, and abilities to meet the needs of the people and should 
function as laboratories of democracy.”)  The States have a long history 
of leadership on health care reform—indeed, the Act incorporated the 
valuable lessons learned from the experience of health care reform prac-
tices by our State and local governments, and preserves the role of our 
States as laboratories of democracy, for example, by giving States con-
siderable policy flexibility.   
There is no basis in the Constitution for Plaintiffs’ claims that the 
Act “violates the constitutional principles of federalism and dual sove-
reignty on which this Nation was founded.”  Am. Compl. ¶ 86.  To the 
contrary, the Act addresses an issue of dire national importance, while 
allowing States room to innovate and shape aspects of health care 
reform to reflect the needs and preferences of their communities, for ex-
ample, on whether and how to establish insurance exchanges.  See ACA 
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§ 1321, 42 U.S.C. 18041; ACA § 1331, 18051; ACA § 1332, 18052.  This 
allows for the diversity and innovation that is the hallmark of the 
States.  See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) 
(Brandeis, J., dissenting) (observing that, under our federalism, “a sin-
gle courageous state may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; 
and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest 
of the country”).   
The benefits of national health care reform for States and their 
citizens will be substantial, in part because the size of the problem with 
health care is so great.  Despite the fact that Americans spent an esti-
mated 2.5 trillion dollars on health care in 2009, more than 45 million 
Americans do not have health insurance.  Pub. L. No. 111-148, §§ 
1501(a)(2)(B), 10106(a), 124 Stat. 119, 907 (2010); see also CONG. BUDG-
ET OFFICE, 2008 KEY ISSUES IN ANALYZING MAJOR HEALTH PROPOSALS 11 
(Dec. 2008); CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE LONG-TERM BUDGET OUTLOOK 
21-22 (June 2009).  Individuals and families face disastrous personal 
and financial consequences when they find themselves with serious 
medical problems and no insurance.  See Pub. L. No. 111-148, §§ 
1501(a)(2)(G), 10106(a) (noting that 62% of all personal bankruptcies 
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are precipitated in part by medical expenses); Institute of Medicine, 
AMERICA’S UNINSURED CRISIS: CONSEQUENCES FOR HEALTH AND HEALTH 
CARE 58, 78-79, 80 (2009) (observing that uninsured people have a high-
er likelihood of being hospitalized and of dying prematurely, and of ex-
periencing greater limitations on their quality of life when compared to 
insured people).  In addition, when the uninsured receive medical assis-
tance, the uncompensated health care costs, which were $43 billion in 
2008, are borne by federal, State and local governments, as well as by 
those who pay for insurance and health care providers.  Pub. L. No. 111-
148, §§ 1501(a)(2)(F), 10106(a).   
The Act will help address these serious problems.  The number of 
uninsured Americans will drop by approximately 32 million by 2019, 
and the average insurance premium paid by individuals and families in 
the individual and small-group markets will be reduced.  Letter from 
Douglas W. Elmendorf, Director, Cong. Budget Office, to the Hon. Nan-
cy Pelosi, Speaker, U.S. House of Representatives 9 (March 20, 2010); 
CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, AN ANALYSIS OF HEALTH INSURANCE PREMIUMS 
UNDER THE PATIENT PROTECTION AND AFFORDABLE CARE ACT 23-25 (Nov. 
30, 2009).  This substantial number of newly covered individuals is 
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achieved in large part by the Act’s requirement that the States expand 
Medicaid to all non-elderly individuals with incomes up to 133 percent 
of the poverty line, or about $29,000 for a family of four.   
Plaintiffs allege that the Act’s Medicaid-related provisions violate 
constitutional principles of federalism because they amount to “coercion 
and commandeering.”  Am. Compl. ¶¶ 83-86.  This claim fails because 
the States cannot be “coerced” into doing anything with respect to Medi-
caid—Medicaid is a voluntary federal-State partnership, which the 
States could opt out of if their leaders and citizens so desired, avoiding 
the Act’s new requirements for expanded Medicaid coverage.  Recogniz-
ing that Medicaid is a valued program that provides crucial access to 
care for millions of the Plaintiffs’ constituents, however, the Plaintiffs 
attempt a novel argument that tries to keep what they like about the 
program, including substantial federal funding, while avoiding the Act’s 
new requirements, which they oppose.  See Am. Compl. ¶ 66.  This 
claim presents neither a claim of coercion nor of commandeering and 
should be rejected.   
Medicaid is “a cooperative federal-state program through which 
the Federal Government provides financial assistance to States so that 
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they may furnish medical care to needy individuals.”  Wilder v. Va. 
Hosp. Ass’n, 496 U.S. 498, 502 (1990).  It is, and always has been, a vo-
luntary program for the States.  Id.  Medicaid enables States to receive 
a significant amount of federal aid in exchange for the States’ establish-
ing public health insurance programs for the poor, subject to minimum 
federal requirements, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1396(a)(10)(A)(I) (requiring the 
States to extend medical coverage to “categorically needy” individuals).  
Congress expressly reserved the right to amend Medicaid, 42 U.S.C. § 
1304, and has done so many times.  E.g., Social Security Amendments 
of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-603, 86 Stat. 1329 (1972) (requiring participat-
ing States to extend Medicaid to recipients of Supplemental Security 
Income); Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-
239, 103 Stat. 2106 (1989) (requiring States to expand Medicaid cover-
age to pregnant women and children under six-years-old, subject to cer-
tain income limits).  States do not have to participate in Medicaid at all; 
Arizona did not join Medicaid until 1982.  See Management of Arizona 
Medicaid Waiver: Hearings before the Subcomm. on Health & the Envi-
ronment of the House Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 98th Cong., 2d 
Sess. 222 (1984). 
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Starting on January 1, 2014, the Act will expand Medicaid eligibil-
ity to individuals under 65 with incomes below 133% of the poverty line, 
expanding coverage to millions of people who could otherwise not afford 
health insurance.  To ease the burden on the States, the federal gov-
ernment will assume 100% of the Medicaid costs of covering newly eli-
gible individuals for the first three years; federal support will phase 
down slightly over the following several years, so that for 2020 and all 
subsequent years, the federal government will be responsible for 90% of 
the costs of covering these individuals.  JANUARY ANGELES & MATTHEW 
BROADUS, FEDERAL GOVERNMENT WILL PICK UP NEARLY ALL COSTS OF 
HEALTH REFORM’S MEDICAID EXPANSION 3 (Center on Budget and Policy 
Priorities, April 20, 2010).  The States’ share of the cost of the Medicaid 
expansion will be approximately $20 billion.  This represents just a 
1.25% increase over the $1.6 trillion that States were projected to spend 
on Medicaid, for fewer people, over the same time frame, in the absence 
of health care reform.  Id. at 4.  At the same time, the Congressional 
Budget Office estimates that the Medicaid changes will result in $434 
billion in extra Medicaid and Children’s Health Insurance Program 
money flowing to the States between 2010 and 2019.  Expanding health 
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care coverage will also substantially lower the cost to States for uncom-
pensated care.  See Council of Economic Advisors, The Impact of Health 
Insurance Reform on State and Local Governments (Sept. 15, 2009).  
Amici State Legislators believe this represents a good deal for their con-
stituents and their States.  
Plaintiffs appear to argue that this is too good a deal: one that 
they can’t refuse.  But it has been true for several decades, at least, that 
while “State participation in Medicaid is entirely voluntary, [] it is in a 
state’s interest to participate since otherwise the state and its localities 
would, as a practical matter, have to provide many of the same services 
without the financial assistance of the federal government.”  Elizabeth 
Anderson, Administering Health Care: Lessons from the Health Care 
Financing Administration’s Waiver Policy-Making, 10 J.L. & POL. 215, 
220 (1994).   
The Supreme Court has made clear that the temptation to accept 
federal funds does not amount to coercion.  South Dakota v. Dole, 483 
U.S. 203, 212 (1987).  The Constitution allows the federal government 
to condition federal funds and programs in a certain way, allowing 
States to choose whether to participate and accept those conditions, or 
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not.  It is well-established that “Congress may attach conditions on the 
receipt of federal funds.”  Id. at 206.  When the Supreme Court vali-
dated the Social Security Act, for example, it recognized that to hold 
that “motive or temptation [on the part of a State to comply with a con-
dition attached to a federal appropriation grant] is equivalent to coer-
cion is to plunge the law in endless difficulty.”  Steward Machine Co. v. 
Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 589-90 (1937). 
Congress’s spending power enables it to condition the disburse-
ment of federal funds on States’ meeting particular criteria.  This ex-
tends to conditions that require States to fund programs or otherwise 
spend state funds for particular purposes.  See King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 
309 (1968) (upholding statute that conditioned federal matching funds 
on certain State actions, including the expenditure of State funds, be-
cause, if Alabama wanted to continue receiving the federal funds, it had 
to abide by the conditions).  If the State finds the conditions too oner-
ous, it may simply refuse the federal funds.  See Oklahoma v. United 
States Civil Service Comm’n, 330 U.S. 127, 143-44 (1947).  
Similarly, the voluntary nature of Medicaid renders the Plaintiffs’ 
“commandeering” claim regarding the Act’s expansion of Medicaid cov-
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erage to over 16 million more low-income adults and children ground-
less.  The Supreme Court’s “anti-commandeering” jurisprudence holds 
that the federal government “may not compel the States to enact or ad-
minister a federal regulatory program.”  Printz v. United States, 521 
U.S. 898, 926 (1997); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 188 
(1992).  But again, the States are not compelled to enact or administer 
the Medicaid expansion required by the Act—they can opt out of Medi-
caid altogether.  Losing federally-funded Medicaid would surely be a 
bitter pill to swallow for Plaintiffs and their constituents, but Congress 
may constitutionally “hold out incentives to the states as a method of 
influencing a state’s policy choices.”  New York, 505 U.S. at 166; see also 
id. at 167 (“Where the recipient of federal funds is a State, as is not un-
usual today, the conditions attached to the funds by Congress may in-
fluence a State’s legislative choices.”)  So long as Congress merely “en-
courages state regulation rather than compelling it, state governments 
remain responsive to the local electorate’s preferences; state officials 
remain accountable to the people.”  Id. at 168. 
Indeed, while Plaintiffs dramatically suggest that opting out of 
Medicaid could have “severe consequences for poor Americans” similar 
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to those that resulted from another “health-related event,” Hurricane 
Katrina, Pls.’ Mem. Supp. S. J. at 36 n.34, other State leaders (even 
some who also represent States of the Plaintiffs) have expressed their 
support for rejecting the Affordable Care Act’s Medicaid expansion and 
withdrawing from the program.  E.g., Althea Fung, Texas Considers 
Opting Out of Medicaid, NATIONAL JOURNAL, Nov. 15, 2010; Emily 
Ramshaw & Marilyn Serafini, Battle Lines Drawn Over Medicaid in 
Texas, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16, 2010 (noting that “the idea of dropping out 
of Medicaid is on the table in Texas and roughly a dozen other states, 
including Alabama, Mississippi, Washington and Wyoming”).  This may 
not be a wise policy choice, but it is a possible choice—and one that de-
monstrates that States are not impermissibly “coerced” into remaining 
in the Medicaid program. 
The decision State leaders face is clear: whether to take steps to 
implement the Act’s expansion of Medicaid and work in partnership 
with the federal government to provide better health care for State res-
idents, or to opt out of Medicaid altogether.  Either of these choices is 
possible (although Amici State Legislators believe the first path is bet-
ter for their States and their constituents).  Congress established Medi-
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caid in Title XIX of the Social Security Act of 1965; the States then had 
the option whether to jointly fund the program with the federal gov-
ernment, or not.  Here, Congress has voted to expand Medicaid to help 
reduce the number of uninsured people by 32 million in the next ten 
years; States can again determine whether to continue working with 
the federal government in the Medicaid partnership, or not.  In either 
case, the elected federal officials and the elected State leaders will be 
accountable for their choices.  The Plaintiffs seek to avoid that accoun-
tability by asking the Court to invalidate the new conditions placed on 
Medicaid funds while retaining the existing, popular portions of the 
program.  Such an argument does not properly raise a claim of uncons-
titutional “commandeering” or “coercion” and should be rejected. 
Amici State Legislators support the steps toward effective health 
care reform undertaken in the Affordable Care Act and believe that the 
Act is fully constitutional.  As State leaders who have taken an oath to 
be faithful to the U.S. Constitution and who are actively working to im-
plement and prepare for various requirements of the Act, Amici respect-
fully urge the Court to uphold the constitutionality of the Act.  Congress 
has the power to regulate the nearly 20 percent of the U.S. economy 
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that is the health care industry, and, when faced with a national health 
care crisis where millions are uninsured and cannot afford decent 
health care, is empowered to act to reform the health care industry.  
Far from offending constitutional principles of federalism, the Act re-
flects how the federal and state governments can work together to pro-
tect their citizens and resources. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Amici respectfully request that, if the 
Court finds the Plaintiffs have standing, the Court uphold the constitu-
tionality of the Affordable Care Act and reject Plaintiffs’ claims on the 
merits. 
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